The Russian non-strategic (tactical) nuclear exercise

In 2024, Russia, in conjunction with Belarus, held what Russia called a three-part non-strategic (tactical) nuclear exercise whose purpose, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry, was training in the “…practical aspects of the preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Russia stages yearly large strategic nuclear exercises sometimes involving non-strategic nuclear weapons and many smaller ones involving the strategic forces. Russia often stages theater war exercises which reportedly always end in Russia’s simulated nuclear first use. However, Russia had never previously announced a non-strategic nuclear exercise. Since Russia’s initial announcement of simulated nuclear weapons first use in the Zapad [West]-1999 exercise, Russia had never again officially announced nuclear weapons use. The political purpose of the overt non-strategic nuclear exercise was to intimidate the West and deter assistance to Ukraine.

The second phase of the exercise was broadened to cover almost the entire Russian border with NATO. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) said, “The crews of navy ships involved in the training will equip sea-based cruise missiles with special [nuclear] mock warheads and enter designated patrol areas.” The Russian MoD also indicated the exercise would involve nuclear-capable Backfire bombers, Mig-31s, cruise missiles and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. The exercise involved what the Russians call “electronic launches” (everything short of igniting and launching the missile).

In addition to the well-known nuclear-capable Russian missiles (e.g., Iskander, Kinzhal and various cruise missiles), Belarus announced that nuclear warheads were mounted on Belarus’ Su-25 aircraft and the “Polonez operational-tactical complexes.” Belarus Security Council State Secretary Alexander Volfovich said, “Iskander tactical missile systems and Polonez operational-tactical complexes will be secretly withdrawn to designated positions where Belarusian servicemen will deal with issues of preparing, planning and using the special [nuclear] munitions.” The fact that the Polonez was a Belarusian design suggests that Russia had long been planning this type of deployment and there must have been bilateral cooperation to adapt a Russian nuclear warhead to this Belarusian missile.

In the third phase of the exercise, the Russian MoD said, “Aerospace Forces aviation units taking part in the exercise will practice equipping air-to-air weapons with special [nuclear] warheads and flying to designated patrol areas.”[1] This confirms reports that Russia has nuclear air-to-air missiles. A declassified year 2000 CIA report observed, “Moscow’s military doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons has been evolving and probably has served as the justification for the development of very low-yield, high-precision nuclear weapons. The range of applications will ultimately be determined by Russia’s evolving nuclear doctrine, and could include artillery, air-to-air weapons, ABM weapons, anti-satellite weapons or multiple rocket launchers against tanks or massed troops.…” According to aviation journalist Piotr Butowski, the Russian Mig-31 interceptor can carry the R-33S (AA-9) missiles fitted with a nuclear warhead.[2]

The Polonez is a Multiple Rocket Launcher or a bombardment rocket. There is no reference to Russian nuclear-capable multiple rocket launchers or air-to-air missiles in the supposedly authoritative Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) assessment of Russian nuclear capability.[3] The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report indicated that Russia had nuclear-capable CRBMs (Close Range Ballistic Missiles) which is the DoD’s language for Multiple Rocket Launchers. In 2017, based on Russian Defense Ministry exercise disclosures, this author wrote, “In May 2014, Russia staged a major nuclear exercise, presided over by President Putin, that involved the announced launch of several tactical nuclear capable missiles and bombardment rockets.”

The retention of nuclear air-to-air missiles is particularly significant because of all types of tactical nuclear weapons, they probably give the least benefit compared to conventional warheads. The existence of such weapons is additional evidence that Russia plans to use nuclear weapons extensively in a war against NATO as a substitute for precision conventional weapons. This is warfighting rather than deterrence because there is no comparable Western nuclear capability to deter.

According to Russian expatriate Dr. Nikolai Sokov “…nuclear exercises have been conducted with targets in Europe, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even the continental United States,” adding that “…all large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes.” Reports of Russian simulated nuclear escalation have appeared in the Russian press, the Western press and U.S. government disclosures. NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg indicated that Russia had simulated the use of nuclear weapons against NATO states and even against then-neutral Sweden, a non-nuclear state. This contradicts Russia’s supposed “negative assurances” which maintains that Russia will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. In 2022, the Swedish press reported that Russia practiced a nuclear attack on Sweden with aircraft actually carrying nuclear weapons. Concurrent with this provocation, President Vladimir Putin reportedly “…sent missives to authorities in Finland and Sweden asking them to provide security guarantees for Moscow amid the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war.” There is no mystery why both nations joined NATO.

“Security guarantees” are Russian demands for acceptance of vassal-state status. This is what Putin’s nuclear threats are really about. It should not be forgotten that just before Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, he sent what amounted to an ultimatum to NATO. Reuters observed these “security guarantees” would drastically alter the post-Cold War order in Europe.

Putin personally declared, “You should give us guarantees. You! And without any delay! Now!”

The left wants to believe that Putin’s nuclear policy is defensive. This is not the case. For over two months prior to his invasion of Ukraine, President Putin and his government were threatening nuclear war. Just before he started the war, Putin staged a major strategic nuclear exercise in which he showcased Russia’s new nuclear “superweapons.” Nuclear threats from the Putin regime have continued and even escalated. According to NATO’s July 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué, “We condemn Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signaling. Unfortunately, there has yet to be a concrete response.”

The first use of nuclear weapons is central to Russian strategy. In 2003, Russia’s Defense Ministry stated, “De-escalation of aggression is forcing the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons.”[4] In 2015, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and then–Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld testified before Congress that the Russian view that “…they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire.” In 2017, then-Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia has built the concept of “de-escalation” of a conflict through nuclear escalation “…into their operational concept, we’ve seen them exercise that idea.” In 2018, General John Hyten, then-Commander of STRATCOM, characterized Russian strategy as “escalate to win.” The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report noted that Russia believes “…that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.” In 2024, Director of Central Intelligence William Burns stated that, “There was a moment in the fall [autumn] of 2022 when I think there was a genuine risk of [Putin’s] potential use of tactical nuclear weapons.”

The assumption behind Russian strategy, as Derek Williams and Adam B. Lowther have pointed out, is the belief that Russia can start a nuclear conflict, control it and win because +“…the United States lacks the will and the weapons to respond not only to limited nuclear war but the cohesive use of nuclear deterrence for political gain.”

According to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitriy Peskov, Putin ordered the 2024 non-strategic nuclear drills in response to “…provocative statements and threats by certain Western officials against the Russian Federation.” This is not exactly the strongest rationale ever advanced to practice starting a nuclear war, particularly when “provocative” and “threats” are seen through the warped world view of Putin’s Russia.

The FAS’ conclusion that Russia is reducing its non-strategic nuclear weapons is not supported by evidence and is contradicted by the Biden White House, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, which all say Russia is increasing its nuclear weapons. The absence of the nuclear-capable Close Range Ballistic Missiles in the FAS’ assessment of Russian non-strategic nuclear systems potentially results in a large undercounting of Russia’s capabilities and numbers. These weapons may have been produced in large numbers as longer range substitutes for or augmentations of nuclear artillery and as substitutes for precision conventional weapons. (In 2013, former head of the Sarov nuclear weapons laboratory Academician Yevgeniy Avrorin stated that the 152 mm one-kiloton nuclear shell was “widely deployed” with the Russian Army.)

Dr. Phillip Karber, President of the Potomac Foundation, reports that Russia has nuclear weapons with as yields as low as 20-tons of TNT. A 20-ton nuclear yield is vastly more lethal than 20-tons of TNT because of the lethal effects of prompt nuclear radiation. These can be used, in the right weather conditions, very close to the forward edge of the battle area as much more effective replacements for precision conventional weapons. According to Dr. Karber, 20-ton yield nuclear weapons would double the effectiveness of Russian long-range precision missiles. In December 2017, Dr. Karber and Lieutenant General (ret.) T. Cadieu stated that among the about 5,000 Russian tactical nuclear weapons, Russia had “2,050 modern warheads” which include nuclear artillery, have yields as low as 20-tons of TNT and “include enhanced radiation weapons.”

It is clear that Russia has recognized for decades the potential warfighting advantages of low-yield nuclear weapons. As far back as 1999, Colonel-General Vladimir Muravyev, then-Deputy Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces stated, “They [nuclear weapons] are capable of nullifying the combat qualities of all modern conventional systems.” In 2006, Admiral Mikhail Abramov, Chief of the Main Naval Headquarters, stated that the role of the country’s naval forces is to “…deliver surprise and concentrated strikes, including use of nuclear weapons at surface targets, aircraft carrier task force[s], detachments of warships and transport convoys, [and] to fight successfully against submarines of any enemy.”[5]

In February 2024, in a very important and interesting report, the Financial Times revealed, “The [Russian] classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.” In August 2024, a second Financial Times article also based upon on what it said was classified Russian documents dating from 2008 to 2014 involving nuclear exercises, revealed some of the actual targets for Russian naval tactical nuclear weapons. This included facilities in Britain and France because Russia viewed tactical nuclear weapons as potentially decisive in conflicts. It is interesting that the late Warsaw Pact War plan, now available on the internet, had ended nuclear targeting of Britain and France, presumably because they had obtained a substantial nuclear deterrence capability. However, since then, both Britain and France have dramatically reduced their nuclear capability.

Thus, the apparent result of the “peace dividend” is resumed nuclear targeting of Britain and France by Putin’s Russia. Unfortunately, when Putin looks at the world, this NATO depiction is what he sees. Even more disturbing is that, as the Russian non-strategic nuclear exercise indicates, Russia has even more nuclear capability than depicted on this NATO chart.

The near elimination of U.S.  tactical nuclear weapons, the result of a George H.W. Bush White House dictate to the Department of Defense,[6] constitutes one of most short-sighted national security decisions in U.S. military history. As a result, Russia probably largely discounts the military significance of the U.S. non-strategic arsenal since it is based only on nuclear bombs which on a day-to-day basis lack survivability. Despite the current Ukraine crisis, the Biden Administration has done nothing to increase the survivability of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear deterrent. One of the recommendations of the bipartisan United States Strategic Posture Commission was that “…the U.S. theater nuclear force posture should be modified in order to provide the President a range of militarily effective response options to deter or counter Russian or Chinese limited nuclear use in theater.” Putin’s enthusiasm for nuclear escalation, as depicted in his recent non-strategic nuclear exercise, appears to be a direct result of the opportunity Western nuclear weapons cuts have provided. Putin has embraced nuclear warfighting as the road to power, glory, victory and Russian political domination of its neighbors.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

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